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Global Citizenship and the European Milieu:
Contested and Considered
Frank J. Lechner
There is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely
as such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to
ourselves.
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature

I. Introduction
The Dutch have long thought that they are an exemplary nation, a guide and a beacon to
the world, or as they used to put it, a “gidsland” for others to follow.1 As early as the
1600s, they vaunted their commitment to freedom and tolerance; later, they displayed a
special zeal for peace, especially international peace. Since the 1960s, they have claimed
a place in the front ranks of progressive nations, building a caring welfare state and
expanding the rights of citizens—including the right to shop for things other than coffee
at numerous “coffee shops.” Of course, they were not always consistent in acting out
these virtues, as the Dutch themselves are well aware, which is one reason why most
would now use the term gidsland with a healthy sense of irony, as a way to skewer
pretensions to moral superiority. These days, in fact, the Dutch have a relative low
opinion of their influence.2 They may be right: the outside world has not necessarily
taken much notice of the stellar example set in the low countries—and when outsiders
paid attention at all, they did not always like what they saw. To Dutch regret, the City in
the Polder was not quite as visible or inspiring as the City on a Hill.
Even if their claim to moral leadership is open to question, the Dutch today are in the
forefront of many global issues, including a potential push toward “global citizenship,”
the topic of this essay. Their long-standing commitment to international law and human
rights is reflected in the many legal institutions they host in The Hague. The Dutch have
been very active in global civil society as well, playing a leading role in environmental
organizations and supporting NGO work on development. At least for a while, they
welcomed immigrants in a multicultural spirit, downplaying the need for integration into
a national culture. In fact, focusing publicly on nation and national identity was not quite
politically correct until recently. For a long time the Dutch have also been committed
Europeans, actively contributing to expansion of the European Union (EU). In all these
ways, and in keeping with an older tradition, they have looked beyond state boundaries
and committed themselves to transnational causes. To some extent that applies even to
soccer coaches, stars, and fans, intensely involved in the “global game.” If we
characterize global citizens as people who identify with the world as a whole, aim to play
an active role in it, and develop a “significant identity, loyalty or commitment beyond the
nation-state,”3 we should find them in the Netherlands.
In a way, that is not surprising. By tradition and by choice, the Netherlands has long
been a quite open society. The Dutch Republic, after all, pursued its commercial interests
across the globe. It welcomed many people from many places, who could speak relatively
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freely regardless of national background. It is no accident that a seventeenth-century
Dutch scholar, Hugo Grotius, helped to lay the foundation for what we now call
international law, embedding state action in common norms. In a later period, the
religious fervor of Protestants and Catholics led many to venture into foreign lands as
missionaries, creating yet more transnational attachments.
At the same time, the Dutch had little choice in cultivating their cosmopolitan
inclinations. As a small power among giants, the modern Netherlands naturally favored a
foreign policy that played down the ruthless play of power and instead focused on
pursuing the common good guided by moral principles. Hosting peace conferences and
legal institutions, which the Dutch pioneered in the late-nineteenth century, fit this
strategic moralism that made at least the Dutch elite approximate what we now refer to as
“global citizenship.”
Dutch support for European unification also stems from this mixture of moralism and
strategic thinking. After World War II, taming Germany was a practical move. A
common market would serve Dutch commercial interests. Building a common European
“house” was good in principle, at least as long as French or German architects did not
hold exclusive sway. It is not unreasonable to think of this European commitment as
another step toward, or even an instance of, global citizenship. Certainly many
intellectual defenders of the Union treat it as an exemplary experiment in rational
transnationalism, showing the way to a more global solidarity. For all its innovative
features, however, the EU remains beholden to state interests and national identities, and
it therefore falls short of high cosmopolitan expectations. As a step toward global
citizenship, to anticipate some other skeptical points I will make below, its record is
ambiguous at best.
How exemplary are the Dutch themselves? How cosmopolitan are they really? In what
ways, if any, do they help to move global citizenship from moral vision to empirical fact?
In this essay, I will sketch some of the steps they have taken on the path toward global
citizenship, but at the same time describe some hurdles they have encountered. At the risk
of committing the sin of “methodological nationalism,” I will use the Dutch case to
explore what Beck and Sznaider have called “cosmopolitanization.”4 Inspired by
Delanty’s more general discussion of global citizenship, I will focus on three areas,
briefly examining the Dutch as contributors to the global game and global governance,
and as proponents of a multicultural transnationalism.5 I approach the case as a fascinated
skeptic; fascinated by Dutch involvement in global flows and their responses to
globalizing pressures but skeptical about the extent to which such involvement fosters an
enduring global citizenship. My point about Dutch strategic moralism already alludes to
my mixed assessment, which fits some strains in the literature on the subject as well. In
thinking about global citizenship, we can learn some useful lessons from the Dutch case
considered in its European context.
II. Background
Both my own work and the wider academic literature give reason to think that global
citizenship may flourish as more than a figment of the philosophical imagination. With
John Boli, I wrote a book, World Culture: Origins and Consequences (2005), which
explored ways in which world culture increasingly structures our experience, subjecting a
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wide range of activities to global norms. We combined two influential ways of thinking,
neoinstitutionalist or world polity theory and globalization theory, which entail some
basic claims about global citizenship: at the very least, national citizenship will
increasingly be “relativized” or disembedded in relation to conceptions of humankind, as
Roland Robertson would put it, and such old-fashioned citizenship will also be subjected
to external constraints, holding states to account in terms of universal rights, as John
Meyer and Yasemin Soysal would put it. A second book, Globalization: The Making of
World Society (2009), treats globalization generically as the process in which more
people become more connected in more different ways across larger distances. Though
my subtitle hedges a bit on the status of “world society,” it certainly implies some serious
questions about who belongs and how. In principle, global citizenship captures the
various attempts to answer that question. My third book, The Netherlands: Globalization
and National Identity (2008), is a case study of globalization, examining how the Dutch
redefine their national identity in response to various globalizing pressures. While the
Netherlands has witnessed a kind of nationalist revival, I argued that many leading
figures have also worked on what I call a “cosmopolitan” nationalism instead of
withdrawing behind their dikes. If that is correct, the Dutch should remain eager to help
fashion more global forms of citizenship.
The broader literature is even more emphatic about the prospects for global citizenship.
Many commentators, of course, view globalization as a spur to global citizenship: the
more people become connected in fact, the more they will want to feel they belong to a
community wider than the nation-state. This is a quasi-functional argument in the sense
that it portrays global citizenship as a form that meets a need. Several authors go a step
further, arguing that we, all of us, are already global citizens, at least in the minimal sense
that we carry rights and duties as human beings,6 belonging to a world that in effect has
become a single place. Many people who think about global citizenship take another step
beyond what I have suggested, namely, that it is an inherently good and moral project,
perhaps even essential to the flourishing of humanity. This explicitly cosmopolitan stance
on global citizenship thus contains a strong normative argument. Discussions of global
citizenship often mix these elements, for example by suggesting that we have moral
obligations to humanity that require certain already developing institutions for their
adequate expression.7 I will comment briefly on the normative element in discussions of
global citizenship below, but for empirical analysis the idea that all of us already are
global citizens is not very helpful. I prefer to use the sometimes fuzzy notion of global
citizenship as an empirical yardstick, a way to examine how and how far particular
people are actually moving toward “identity, loyalty and commitment beyond the nationstate.”
The literature on my three areas of interest bolsters the optimistic case to some extent.
For example, much work on global governance has tried to chart the “retreat of the state”
and the rise of new forms of transnational authority.8 The relative autonomy of the
International Criminal Court, headquartered in The Hague, is a case in point. Similarly,
work on civil society has made the case that nongovernmental organizations of all sorts
represent universal values detached from national interests.9 Relevant examples include
many environmental organizations, for instance the World Wildlife Fund, co-founded by
a Dutch prince; Greenpeace, now headquartered in Amsterdam; and Friends of the Earth,
with an 81,000-member Dutch affiliate (called Milieudefensie). Finally, migration
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scholars have suggested that we may be witnessing a new kind of transnationalism
emerge among immigrants who are granted more extensive rights without having to
assimilate into host countries.10 The Netherlands, for example, grants all residents local
voting rights and subsidizes minority organizations even as the denizens also maintain
their original nationality. Lots of trends push lots of people out of the nation-state shell, a
necessary though perhaps not sufficient condition for realizing the Kantian project.
Some of this work also displays a more skeptical streak. Students of governance, for
example, have questioned the “retreat” of the state by showing that states are stubborn,
both in holding on to their key tasks and as strategic actors on the global scene.11 The
actual structure of global governance—fragmented, partial, and messy—hardly reflects
the idea and vision of a common good.12 Others target the work of global civil society by
questioning its selective concern and lack of representativeness,13 and even fairly
sympathetic analysts counsel against an overly “romantic” view of the global good done
by civil society groups.14 Many students of migration, finally, find “bifocal” identities on
the part of migrants as well as renewed integration efforts on the part of states more likely
than full-fledged transnationalism.15 This work leaves the form and viability of global
citizenship unclear.
Thinking about the Dutch case adds to this literature in two ways: by making abstract
discussions of global citizenship a bit more tangible, and by reinforcing the skeptical
thrust of relevant scholarship on some key points. By itself, of course, a single case does
not allow us to generalize about global trends. Yet before we make confident claims
about such trends—for example, about the actual prospects for global citizenship—it
helps to have a good feel for its constituent parts. To understand globalization, or the way
in which spatial constraints on our lives diminish, it is important to see how it “takes
place.” From that perspective, it is not surprising that some very good work on
globalization looks at it from within a distinctly “local,” or perhaps I should say “glocal,”
setting. Discussions of global citizenship could benefit from this approach. The Dutch
case matters in a more specific way as well. If it is true that the Dutch show more zeal
than most in the pursuit of global citizenship, the particular dilemmas and difficulties
they face should be especially instructive. To put it more concretely, I will argue that the
Dutch case, and by implication the broader European experience, raises serious questions
about the eventual crystallization of meaningful global citizenship. There is no straight
path to global citizenship. It is often twisted, doubles back, or leads into muddy ruts. That
pattern suggests that a “dialectical” approach to studying these sorts of issues might be
most productive, sensitizing us to the way in which globalizing, space-spanning moves
are always likely to be met by particularizing, resistant countermoves. In the end, I will
suggest, national and global citizenship do not have to be competing opposites.
In this essay, I mainly offer description and analysis, but I am not a neutral observer.
Visions of global citizenship, cosmopolitanism, and global democracy have aroused
significant debate. In that wider debate I do not side entirely with those who reject
altogether the desirability of citizenship beyond the nation-state,16 but I do think that in
the near future, for most people in most places, acquiring meaningful national citizenship
in liberal democracies governed by the rule of law is most important. I agree with
Axtmann that democratic global citizenship requires mediation by the nation-state17 and,
for reasons different than his, with Miller on the priority of strengthening national
citizenship.18 Without more widespread, more effective national-level citizenship, global
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citizenship is unlikely to flourish in any case. That much a Kantian advocate of global
citizenship could still endorse. Yet I also think it is healthy to balance the Kantian
motivation for the global citizenship project with a bit of Humean humility. Even in the
global age, we should keep in mind Hume’s insistence that most people do not and will
not care much for humanity as such.
III. Examples
Who or what exactly is a global citizen? I have cited some general definitions, as other
commentators on the subject typically do. But before turning to a slightly more general
discussion of the Dutch path to global citizenship, it might be useful to consider some
concrete examples. My examples are three well-known Dutch figures who play a
significant role in civil society, governance, and migration issues.
Example number one is Guus Hiddink, soccer coach extraordinaire. After winning the
European Cup with PSV in 1988, he had a distinguished career abroad, coaching Real
Madrid, South Korea, Australia, Chelsea, and most recently, the Russian national team.
In nearly every case, he was credited with reviving a team and moving it to a higher
level, based on understanding both the team’s own culture and the demands of top-level
international soccer. In South Korea, whose team he helped reach the World Cup
semifinals, he became a national hero. Along with some illustrious colleagues, he
exemplifies “identity, loyalty and commitment beyond the nation-state.” If we think of
soccer fandom as a part of global civil society, or at least a global public sphere, Hiddink
may well be one of the best-known Dutch “global citizens.” Dutch coaches and players
have left their imprint on the global game, the Dutch national team is a fixture in
international competition and global discourse about such competitions, and through
those ties Dutch soccer aficionados feel themselves connected to others. By analogy with
Billig’s “banal nationalism,” I suggest we might call Dutch involvement in the global
game a form of “banal cosmopolitanism.” But while they are adept at looking beyond
borders, the Dutch also have used the global game to refashion their national identity.
Example number two, perhaps slightly more serious for academic purposes, is Ad
Melkert, the former leader of the Dutch Labor Party. In the Netherlands he is known
primarily as the big loser in the 2002 parliamentary elections, in which the party of the
recently assassinated populist Pim Fortuyn made great gains. Prior to this public drama,
however, Melkert had already had a long career dealing with transnational governance.
He had served on the board of the Dutch branch of the European Movement, acted as
secretary of the EC youth forum, and directed Novib, the Dutch branch of Oxfam. After
his electoral loss, he left the Dutch political scene but soon landed on the soft cushion of
an executive director position with the International Monetary Fund, later moving to an
administrator role at the UNDP and more recently being called to serve as U.N. Special
Representative in Iraq. Europe, development, the IMF, the U.N.: as an exemplary
member of the Dutch political elite, Melkert certainly has developed “identity, loyalty
and commitment beyond the nation-state.” Of course, he is not the only one. Many of his
colleagues have attained similarly high positions, and all have embraced similar
commitments to the same causes and organizations. Melkert stands for the high-minded
cosmopolitanism of the Dutch elite. While that Dutch commitment is very real, it is
tempered by hard-nosed calculations based on personal and especially national interests.
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Example number three is Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the Somali-Dutch immigrant and former
Member of Parliament for the conservative-liberal VVD. She became world famous as
the actual target of the assassination of Theo van Gogh by the Muslim radical
Mohammed Bouyeri in 2004. Like many Muslims, Bouyeri viewed her as an apostate
who had brought Islam into disrepute with her criticism of violence against Muslim
women, scandalizing Muslims with the film Submission, whch showed Qur’anic texts on
a semi-nude woman’s body. Though having to live with special security, Hirsi Ali
remained a vigorous advocate of free speech and of human rights for Muslim women,
both in the Netherlands and on a wider global stage. After a dispute over her citizenship
status, she moved to the U.S., while retaining her Dutch passport. Widely honored for her
efforts, she has fashioned herself into a distinctive human rights advocate. A global
citizen in her work— certainly showing “identity, loyalty and commitment beyond the
nation-state”—she also exemplifies a kind of transnationalism as someone who
assimilated thoroughly but ultimately identified with a community beyond the
Netherlands. Though perhaps exemplary from a normative standpoint, this transnational
cosmopolitanism is not exactly representative of the immigrant experience in the
Netherlands—one indication that in dealing with migration, the Dutch may have been
less successful than many wished in creating global citizens.
A. Soccer and the Limits of Banal Cosmopolitanism
For several decades now, the Dutch have helped to shape the global game. Long before
Hiddink ventured onto the international stage, Rinus Michels took his coaching
philosophy to Barcelona, which flourished after attracting Ajax star Johan Cruyff, who
later succeeded as a Barcelona coach as well. Frank Rijkaard, star of a later generation,
followed in Cruyff’s footsteps. Apart from the former players, other Dutch coaches also
have been quite successful, including Louis van Gaal and Dick Advocaat. The Dutch
soccer federation, the KNVB, became renowned for its coaching courses, setting global
standards in teaching the game. Dutch players, of course, have had an even greater
impact. Several cohorts of stars—from the days of Cruyff and Neeskens via Van Basten
and Gullit to Rijkaard and Davids to Van der Sar and Van Persie—have helped to lead
first Dutch and later foreign teams to great success. Early Ajax teams became legends,
later Ajax and PSV teams followed suit. The Dutch national team finished second in two
World Cups in the 1970s and finally won a major tournament at the European
championships in 1988. Prior to the 2010 World Cup, it enjoyed a long unbeaten streak,
earning it a number 3 FIFA ranking.
Far from building a bulwark against “globalization,” then, the Dutch by and large have
relished the challenges posed by the global game. Many professionals, in soccer as in any
other business, naturally developed a striking “identity, loyalty and commitment beyond
the nation-state.” Many fans have become intensely aware of this foreign involvement,
following the exploits of their favorite players and becoming attached to foreign teams.
Aided by greatly expanded media coverage, they have joined a much wider universe of
soccer discourse. If we think of awareness of others, appreciation of difference, and
commitment beyond the nation-state as markers of global citizenship, those qualities
flourish more in fans’ everyday involvement in the game than in many other spheres. To
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capture that everyday quality, and certainly to avoid overly idealistic pretensions, I call
this a form of banal cosmopolitanism.
That cosmopolitanism, like the more serious forms discussed below, has its limits. Most
obviously, top coaches and players do not venture abroad as selfless humanitarians, a
notion often implied in the use of the term global citizenship, but rather as mercenaries in
a transnational entertainment business. They identify with their careers and are loyal
mostly to their paychecks. While taking a strong interest in the global game, the Dutch
are also deeply aware of the consequences for domestic competition, the quality of which
has suffered in the more open markets of this neoliberal era. Pessimists predict that, for
lack of resources, no Dutch club team will ever rise to the European championship level
again. Partly as a way to compensate, the Dutch still take a most fervent interest in the
fortunes of “their” team. The periodic “orange craze” is a national obsession. The global
game played on a global stage is thus used as a means to craft a new type of national
identity or solidarity. Though many fans know better, some even view their supposedly
distinctive brand of “total soccer,” a “brilliant orange” display of offensive-minded
teamwork, 19 as a national contribution to the global game. Under the veneer of banal
cosmopolitanism lie deep national roots.
B. The Netherlands and Global Governance
Like Melkert, the Dutch have become global citizens through their involvement in global
governance. This has taken many forms. As mentioned in the introduction, the
Netherlands hosted many new institutions in the heady days of liberal internationalism at
the end of the nineteenth century, from the Hague Peace conferences to the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, still in business today. At the founding of the United Nations, the
Dutch had some misgivings, especially about the role of the Security Council, but they
soon became disproportionately large U.N. donors and active participants in peacekeeping missions. Naturally, the International Court of Justice would be seated in The
Hague, now the “legal capital of the world.”20 Perhaps uniquely, the Dutch Constitution
in Article 94 provides that international law has “primacy” over domestic law.21 This is
all the more surprising because the Dutch Constitution prohibits judicial review. This
primacy also applies to European law: the Dutch enjoy all the rights of European
citizens22 and the protection of European courts. Dutch citizenship is already embedded
in a broader framework of rights and institutions. Not surprisingly, the Netherlands also
ranks high on various global indexes. On both the Kearney/FP 2007 globalization index
and the 2010 Swiss KOF index, the country ranked third, helped by trade, international
organization membership, and treaty scores. On the 2009 Human Development Index, it
took the same spot. As a contributor to global development, it ranks first. Like Melkert, a
number of prominent Dutchmen have taken high positions in IGOs, from the UNDP to
NATO to UNHCR. Undoubtedly, then, the Netherlands as a country, as well as many
prominent Dutch figures individually, has done much to foster a form of global
citizenship.
But all is not well. Let me cite three examples. Living up to their reputation, the Dutch
provided peace-keeping troops to the U.N. mission in Bosnia in the 1990s. That mission
turned to tragedy when their contingent at Srebrenica was overrun by Bosnian Serbs, who
proceeded to massacre the local Muslims. The event caused much soul-searching in the
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Netherlands, including an authoritative report on the military effort.23 It ultimately caused
a cabinet to take responsibility and step down. At minimum, it told the Dutch that good
intentions are not enough, instilling a new, realistic caution with regard to global
ventures.
A second example concerns the Iraq war. The Netherlands joined the “coalition of the
willing” after combat operations were over and for a while supported reconstruction in
the south. Though their contribution was relatively modest, it was at least symbolically
significant as an endorsement of the U.S. effort. The decision to engage in Iraq has also
become controversial. A high-level investigation of government decision-making
concluded that the legal foundation for that decision was weak,24 putting the current
coalition government in an awkward position by criticizing Prime Minister Balkenende’s
role.
A third example has to do with Afghanistan, where the Dutch have played an important
role as part of NATO forces in Uruzgan. Since the government only agreed to participate
for a limited time, the left-center ruling coalition in 2010 had difficulty responding to a
NATO request for extending the mission in a different form. In the deliberations, which
resulted in a full-fledged crisis, domestic political considerations took priority, with the
Labor Party (and others farther Left) largely opposing further involvement in the area.
Surveys at the time of the cabinet crisis suggested that public opinion was similarly
opposed, in keeping with previous trends.25
My point in citing these examples is not to deny the Dutch cosmopolitan stance in
foreign affairs and global governance. However, the claims of global citizenship still pale
compared to those of pragmatic calculations and domestic politics. In dealing with the
dilemmas of their recent engagements, Dutch policymakers showed a pragmatic streak by
carefully weighing the costs of missions and the benefits of political gestures in securing
alliances. That pragmatism applies to the domestic sphere as well: many foreign
commitments depend on carefully balancing domestic interests and public opinion, part
of which has opposed major foreign involvements, especially those that involve military
action. In deliberations about key decisions, the actual interests of distant others typically
remained secondary; for instance, the needs of Bosnian Muslims, Iraqi Shiites, or
Afghani women did not determine major moves. In all these cases, strategic moralism,
rather than an overriding commitment to the pursuit of human rights in their broadest
sense, marked the Dutch approach. Any claim that a commitment to “global citizenship”
was at stake in Afghanistan would have surprised a majority of the Dutch in 2010.
One more illustration complements this point. For several decades, the Netherlands has
spent a relatively high percentage of its budget on assistance to developing countries,
often close to one percent of GDP. A portion of this funding was channeled through
government-linked NGOs, like NOVIB, once directed by Ad Melkert. Such assistance
became sacrosanct, a symbol of Dutch commitment to humanitarian causes. In recent
years, however, development cooperation has come under fire. Conservative critics, long
skeptical of its benefits, have increased their efforts to reduce Dutch commitments, as
evident in a prominent report by a Liberal Member of Parliament.26 Even more strikingly,
the Scientific Council for Government Policy also issued a skeptical report, questioning
the benefits of traditional assistance and minimally recommending a much more focused
policy.27 Such reports are often harbingers of policy changes. Behind these critiques lies
the economic reality of the post-2007 recession and a strand of public opinion that gives
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priority to domestic spending—clearly indicators of limited solidarity among would-be
global citizens. Whereas hesitations about humanitarian missions are most common on
the political Left, opposition to development assistance comes especially from the
political Right. One implication is that domestic interpretations of the requirements of
global citizenship, and what is to be done to live up to them, vary rather significantly
even in a country whose political system puts a premium on the search for consensus.
In short, measured against the demanding yardstick of global citizenship, the Dutch
record on Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and development assistance is decidedly mixed. A
suitable label might be “selective cosmopolitanism.”
C. The Netherlands in Europe
Melkert’s early role in the European Movement exemplifies widely shared cosmopolitan
hopes. In the run-up to the national referendum on the Constitutional Treaty for the
European Union in 2005, the Dutch social philosopher Guido Berns articulated those
hopes in telling a gathering of interested citizens that a vote for the Constitution would
mark a step toward “hybrid” citizenship.28 If I may paraphrase his argument slightly, it
would make European citizenship more real, more tangible, more valuable. It would take
narrowly focused national citizens out of their national “comfort zones.” Berns used more
exalted language, to be sure, justifying the proposed constitutional framework in Kantian
and Habermassian terms as a modest but important step in heeding the universal demands
of reason over the arbitrary attachments of particular communities. The argument may
have been more sophisticated than most, but the cosmopolitan intent was common in the
Netherlands. Berns and nearly the entire Dutch elite supported the treaty and advocated a
“yes” vote, reflecting their long-standing commitment to integration.
Even more than the Dutch global initiatives, Dutch involvement in Europe is driven
more by pragmatic than Kantian considerations. From the Dutch point of view, market
integration always served their commercial interests, the Community was politically
helpful in taming Germany, and its decision-making structure favored small powers to
some extent by helping to moderate strong-power dominance. Unification thickened over
time, making hybrid citizenship a reality. Their supportive role made the Dutch
exceptionally “good” Europeans.29 But here, too, the sailing got rougher. Part of the
problem lay in the faulty fabric of the Union, long suffering from a democratic deficit,
lacking a common political culture, and complicating its politics with expansion.30
Hybrid citizens were part of a hybrid Union, a mixture of transnational, federal, and statedriven components. Though this hybrid structure may have served Dutch interests, for
many reasons the EU in practice did not quite live up to the high Dutch expectations.
Over the years those expectations became considerably more sober, as a major Dutch
reform proposal was rejected in 1991, prescient Dutch objections prior to adoption of the
Euro were swept aside, and the Netherlands became a net payer to, rather than
beneficiary of, EU funds. Public support for integration remained strong but declined by
at least ten percent over recent decades.31 Even prior to the referendum, Dutch leaders
had begun to sound a more skeptical note about EU affairs, and a former Dutch EuroCommissioner, Frits Bolkestein, pleaded for a slimmer Union focused on “core tasks.”
The referendum result still came as a surprise. By a 2-to-1 majority, voters rejected the
treaty. Since French voters had made the same decision, the Constitution could not go
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into effect and had to be renegotiated, as it now has. The vote was significant as a
sobering reminder of the limits of “euro-enthusiasm,” and in that sense it disappointed the
expectations of EU defenders like Berns. At the same time, it would be wrong to
overinterpret the episode as an instance of parochial euroskepticism, signaling a Dutch
withdrawal from the transnational project. For one thing, the meaning of the vote was in
doubt. Research indicated that voter motives were rather mixed, and later public opinion
data did not convey heightened discontent with the EU. In Europe, the Netherlands also
had little choice but to re-engage. With some moderating adjustments and political armtwisting—but without legitimation by a second Dutch referendum—the renegotiated
Lisbon Treaty provided some of the same structural enhancements sought in the original
Constitution, including a new Union president. The moderation itself, however, does
suggest that Europeans have lowered their own expectations of full political unity and
European citizenship, weakening its vanguard role as a steppingstone toward global
citizenship. European cosmopolitanism is quite selective as well.
D. Migration and its Discontents
As Hirsi Ali’s exceptional experience shows, the Dutch have had greater trouble
grappling with the absorption of newcomers than in dealing with any of the previously
mentioned issues. To many in the Netherlands, the attacks aimed at her seemed to show
the failure of a tolerant, accommodating approach to minorities. That approach had its
roots in the 1980s, when Dutch policymakers began to recognize that the Netherlands had
become a “country of immigration.”32 The “minorities policy” they devised tried to help
minority groups preserve their identities, for example through language teaching in
schools and subsidies for minority organizations. At the same time, of course, minority
groups enjoyed the general rights of citizens, including the protection of Article 1 of the
Dutch Constitution, which prohibits discrimination, and the benefits dispensed by the
Dutch welfare state. Resident non-citizens also gained the right to vote in local elections.
At a later point, dual nationality was allowed in an effort to stimulate nationalization. For
some time, then, the Dutch approach reflected the spirit or model of global citizenship, in
the sense of facilitating participation without pressure, extending rights without
obligations, and respecting difference without imposing a common culture.
Even before the attacks on Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh, however, the Dutch had begun to
worry about the merits of multiculturalism, as the old policy had been labeled. Once
committed to accommodating minority differences, official policy instead had shifted to
focus on “integration,” stressing the need for full participation and minority commitment
to civic duty. In the early 2000s, that policy got a distinct national twist with the
requirement of a civic integration “contract” for newcomers, who had to prove minimal
knowledge of the national culture prior to immigrating. Economic barriers to entry and
tougher provisions on asylum also aimed to stem the flow of migrants. Public opinion
shifted as well, with significant pluralities opposing further immigration.33 Populist
politicians exploited public fears, especially focusing on the “threat” of Islam. By 2004,
Dutch openness to migrants was already in question. Critics described it as a turn toward
“repressive liberalism.”34
If the native-born Dutch only half-heartedly celebrate global citizenship in their
approach to newcomers, what about the newcomers themselves? Roughly half of the
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migrants, more than one million, hail from Western countries. They receive little
attention in public discourse or academic research. In fact, they may display some of the
“transnational” features portions of the literature expects, as relatively footloose people
who participate actively in the host society but are not bound to a particular place or
identity.
For non-Western immigrants, the picture is mixed. A small minority of Muslim radicals
(like Bouyeri) develops a transnational identity as “global Muslims,”35 but not quite in
the way proponents of global citizenship have in mind. A much larger group, especially
in the older generation, remains relatively isolated from the wider host society and
oriented instead to their country of origin, as exemplified by ubiquitous satellite dishes in
some minority neighborhoods. Although assimilating in some respects, younger
generations experience such isolation as well, as indicated by evidence of diminishing
social interaction between groups and mounting segregation in public schools. Many nonWesterners indicate a preference for living and socializing within their own group.
Perhaps one million non-Western residents hold dual citizenship. It might be misleading,
however, to view this record as evidence of steps toward global citizenship. Instead, an
ethnic group orientation seems to prevail, with some “bifocal” effects through ties to the
homeland—more sub-national than transnational.
In the Netherlands, as in the rest of Europe, the status of immigrants and the direction
of integration policy are strongly contested. Some argue that integration has failed while
others note progress over time. Some advocate a more welcoming approach while others
favor a tougher line. Liberal, multicultural, and nationalist arguments clash. Behind the
debates lie contending worldviews, some open and deliberately cosmopolitan, others
more inward-looking and particularistic. The obvious implication is that there is no single
Dutch model, let alone a European one, for how to promote global citizenship through
migration. Both majority policy and minority identification display, at best, a very
ambivalent cosmopolitanism. Even that assessment would strike some Dutch observers as
too positive. In 2010, after all, the populist Party for Freedom, led by vocal critic of Islam
Geert Wilders, won one and a half million votes in the national elections and provided
parliamentary support for a new center-right government, which promised to pursue a
more strict and selective immigration policy while demanding more active integration
efforts on the part of newcomers.
IV. Conclusion
The Dutch are pioneers on the path toward global citizenship as vigorous participants in
the global game, proponents of global governance, and at least partial advocates of
immigrant inclusion. Yet they are not entirely trustworthy guides. In each area, the Dutch
also resist following a straight path and instead take twists and turns. They are very
imperfect global citizens. I have tried to capture the imperfections with the labels banal,
selective, and ambivalent cosmopolitanism. Because the Dutch are in a good position to
play a guiding role and often think of themselves as playing it, their hesitations and
obstacles are instructive. They reinforce some skeptical thrusts in current thinking about
global citizenship.
It is always risky to generalize from a single case, but the Dutch record reflects a
broader European syndrome as well. Both domestic pressures and new global
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entanglements constrain ostensible Kantian aspirations on the old continent. The
difficulties of existing cosmopolitanization raise questions about those aspirations. They
suggest that in understanding the modest cosmopolitan record, a little Humean humility
goes a long way.
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